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INTRODUCTION
 In his influential History of American Law, Lawrence Friedman 
suggests that tort first emerged as an important body of law in the 
late Nineteenth Century.1 Before then, Friedman tells us, tort law 
was “totally insignificant.”2 Implicit in his assessment is a judgment 
that a body of law is significant only insofar as it addresses a large-
scale social problem as such. Thus for Friedman tort became significant 
when it was first called on to function as a compensation system; that 
is, as a governmental response (enfeebled by then-predominant 
commitments to laissez-faire individualism) to the “epidemic” of acci-
dents brought on by the industrial revolution.3
 Friedman’s criterion for significance stacks the deck against tort 
law, which is neither public health law nor accident law. Of course 
accidents give rise to tort claims. And accidents can be fruitfully ap-
proached as a public health problem for which a compensation sys-
tem might provide an adequate solution. However neither of these 
observations tells us what a tort is or what tort law does. A tort is a 
wrong, and tort law is a law of civil recourse. Or so Professor 
Zipursky and I maintain.4 Once one gains a better grasp of what a 
tort is and what tort law does, one will discover that tort is much 
more deeply woven into the fabric of our legal system than histories 
such as Friedman’s suggest. 
 This Article piggybacks on recent historical scholarship to help 
recover the extent to which tort—understood as a law of civil re-
                                                     
?  Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Dick Fallon, Noah Feldman, Jack 
Goldsmith, Don Herzog, David Konig, Tom Lee, Bruce Mann, Eric Nelson, James Pfander, 
John Witt, Adrian Vermeule, and Ben Zipursky, as well as the participants at the Florida 
State University College of Law Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory, for many helpful 
comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are mine.
 1.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985) (dating the 
emergence of torts as a significant branch of law to the second half of the nineteenth century).
 2.  Id. at 467.
 3.  Id. at 468 (treating modern tort law as synonymous with accident law).
 4.  See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010) (arguing that tort law is more satisfactorily understood as a law of 
wrongs and recourse than as accident law). As perhaps should go without saying in this 
context, civil recourse theory is a theory that Professor Zipursky and I have developed in 
numerous coauthored and sole-authored writings. 
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course—was an integral part of American legal practice and legal 
thought long before the industrial revolution.5 It will focus on three 
examples: the Declaration of Independence, the alien tort provisions 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and early federal legislation indemnify-
ing officials who committed torts while discharging their official du-
ties. Attending to these examples will further demonstrate that tort 
law has carried enormous political and legal significance for us from 
the very beginning.  
I. TORT AND CIVIL RECOURSE
 The civil recourse theory of tort is offered as a better interpreta-
tion of Anglo-American tort law than the utilitarian, efficient deter-
rence, and corrective justice theories that have tended to dominate 
modern torts scholarship. Central to tort law, on this interpretation, 
are three interlocking notions of responsibility.6 First, tort law identi-
fies duties that individuals owe to others. These duties are of a dis-
tinctive kind. They are relational duties of noninjury: that is, duties 
to conduct oneself in certain ways toward certain persons so as to 
avoid injuring them (or, in some instances, so as to benefit them).7
For example, negligence law identifies a duty each person owes to 
others who foreseeably might be physically harmed by that person’s 
conduct. Roughly speaking, the duty is to avoid harming them by fail-
ing to take care against harming them. In placing relational duties of 
noninjury at the core of tort law, civil recourse theory stands apart 
most obviously from liability-rule conceptions of tort, but also from 
utilitarian and deontological theories that treat tort duties as univer-
sal in the sense of being owed to society at large, or to humanity. 
Torts, on this view, are failures to live up to responsibilities to act in 
certain ways toward others so as to avoid injuring them. 
 Second, civil recourse theory offers a particular understanding of 
liability as a form of responsibility. In keeping with its articulation of 
relational duties of noninjury owed by an actor to a potential victim, 
tort law treats the breach of this special kind of duty as an occasion 
for a response by the victim.8 One who breaches a relational duty of 
noninjury is (prima facie) subject to liability. Being subject to liabil-
ity, in this context, means being vulnerable to a claim that is initiat-
                                                     
 5.  John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 559-68 (2005) (tracing the 
influence of Coke-Locke-Blackstone conceptions of tort in early U.S. legal history). I should 
state forthrightly that the attempt to extrapolate a moral from other scholars’ historical 
investigations is my project and not something for which they can be held responsible. 
 6.  The analysis provided in this Part tracks that provided in John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts, in RIGHTS AND 
PRIVATE LAW 251 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012). 
 7.  Id. at 260-63.
 8.  Id. at 265-66.
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ed by the victim and backed by the power of the state. If the claim is 
successful, the victim can enlist the state’s aid in her effort to enjoin 
ongoing wrongful conduct or to demand something tangible from the 
wrongdoer in recognition of the wrong done to her. Because the 
wrongs recognized by tort law are all mistreatments of another, they 
are wrongs that generate a power in the victim to respond to the mis-
treatment. Torts are response-able wrongs. 
 Third, civil recourse theory emphasizes the degree to which tort 
law is a matter of political responsibility. Tort law is positive law: it 
is the product of judicial decisions and legislative acts. And yet it is 
not provided entirely at the whim of lawmakers. The provision of tort 
law is itself a responsibility, one that the state owes its citizens, ra-
ther than one that is owed between or among private citizens.9
 Following Locke and others, we have suggested that this respon-
sibility is rooted in the natural privilege of individuals to respond to 
wrongdoing. In a “state of nature,” individuals would enjoy privileges 
to engage in certain forms of self-help. These include the privilege to 
engage in self-defense to prevent imminent physical harm to oneself 
and also the privilege enjoyed by the victim of a wrong to assert him-
self against the wrongdoer in response to the wrong. Insofar as indi-
viduals delegate their natural privileges to governments, and insofar 
as governments justifiably deny individuals the privileges of self-help 
and self-assertion in the name of civil peace and justice, it becomes 
government’s responsibility to provide alternatives. Tort law is a ful-
fillment of this responsibility. 
 The three notions of responsibility I have just outlined are at work 
even in the simplest “A hits B” case. In defining the tort of battery, 
for example, the law identifies a duty of noninjury owed by one to 
others (viz., a duty to refrain from intentionally touching another in a 
harmful or offensive manner), it empowers a response by a person 
who is the victim of a breach of that duty, and it thereby fulfills the 
state’s responsibility to provide an avenue of recourse to the victim 
against the wrongdoer. However, the three senses of responsibility 
come together in a particularly vivid manner when the alleged tort-
feasor is a government official—as, for example, in the domain of 
“constitutional torts.” When a person claims to have been unjustifi-
ably beaten or confined by a police officer, the gist of her claim is that 
the officer violated a legally recognized duty of noninjury owed to her, 
such that she is now entitled to act against the officer and/or the rel-
evant governmental unit by bringing a claim for damages or injunc-
tive relief. Implicit is the further claim that government is responsi-
ble to provide a legal avenue of recourse to victims of wrongs even 
when the wrongdoer is one of its own—a public official acting under a 
                                                     
 9.  Id. at 268-69.
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claim of authority. In other words, according to civil recourse theory, 
a government’s responsibility to enact a law of civil recourse is a re-
sponsibility to apply that law not only to private citizens, but also to 
its officials.10
 Terms like “redress,” “natural privilege,” and “state of nature” are 
part of the abstract discourse of legal and political theory. And the 
idea of a government being responsible to provide a law of wrongs—
including law under which its own officials can be held responsible—
may seem not merely abstract but unrealistic. Who is to see to it that 
this responsibility is heeded? Yet all are longstanding features of 
English legal discourse and practice, at least as it has been interpret-
ed by prominent lawyers and legal commentators since the time of 
Coke and Hale. Their ideas, as well as Locke’s, in turn informed the 
systematic and highly influential reconstruction of English law of-
fered by Blackstone in his Commentaries, and by that route their 
ideas were received into American law.11
II. OUR FOUNDING LAWSUIT
 David Armitage has helpfully observed that the Declaration of In-
dependence can be divided into five parts.12 First, it identifies the oc-
casion for its issuance.13 A “People” who have heretofore been politi-
cal subjects but who now claim the “separate and equal station to 
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them” must, 
out of “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” make a case for 
that claim.14 Second, the Declaration identifies the premises from 
which this effort at justification would proceed.15 Government is in-
stituted by the consent of the governed to secure certain rights. When 
a government demonstrates by a “long train of abuses and usurpa-
tions” a design to destroy these rights, a people are entitled, and in-
deed obligated, to institute a new government that promises to better 
secure those rights.16 Third, the Declaration details the “repeated in-
juries and usurpations” that establish King George’s tyrannical de-
signs and therefore justify the formation of a new polity.17 Fourth, it 
explains that the colonists—having repeatedly “Petitioned for Re-
dress” to the crown only to be met with “repeated injury”—have ex-
                                                     
 10.  To say that a government bears this responsibility is not to say that it must treat 
public officials and private citizens on identical terms. There might be reasons uniquely 
applicable to public officials that warrant defining the duties of noninjury under which 
they act differently from the duties of noninjury under which private citizens act.
 11.  See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 531-39.
 12.  DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: AGLOBAL HISTORY 26-28 (2007). 
 13. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) [hereinafter THE DECLARATION].
 14. Id.
15. Id. at para. 2. 
 16. Id.
 17. Id.
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hausted other avenues of recourse.18 Finally, the Declaration con-
cludes with an act of self-assertion and a plea. It announces the dis-
solution of the colonies’ connections to the British crown and asserts 
their new standing as a free, independent union with all the attrib-
utes of nationhood.19 At the same time, by insisting that the colonies 
“of Right ought to be” free and independent, the Declaration invites 
validation of its assertions.20
 Armitage describes the Declaration as “an announcement in the 
form of an argument, possibly patterned according to rules of logic 
that Thomas Jefferson . . . had learned during his student days.”21
Still more to the point is Garry Wills’s suggestion that the Declara-
tion was conceived by Jefferson as a legal document patterned ac-
cording to those that Jefferson read, copied and annotated under the 
tutelage of George Wythe and in Jefferson’s eight years of law prac-
tice.22 As explained recently by David Konig, Jefferson’s legal stud-
ies and practice included the preparation of detailed reports of cases 
from the English courts, as well as the study of Coke and Black-
stone.23 Although Jefferson would later come to disdain ordinary law 
practice and to reject Blackstone’s constitutional thought as incom-
patible with republican principles,24 Jefferson at the time of the Dec-
laration was not a law skeptic or court skeptic in the mold of Ben-
tham. Rather, he embraced a “Whig” conception of the common law, 
including England’s unwritten constitution, as the protector of Eng-
lish liberties against governmental predations.25 In keeping with this 
outlook, he was drawn to the idea that ordinary civil litigation—for 
example, an action for trespass brought against occupying British 
troops—could be used to hold English officials accountable for viola-
tions of their legal obligations.26
                                                     
 18. Id. at para. 4.
 19. Id. at para. 6.
 20. Id.
 21.  ARMITAGE, supra note 12, at 26.
 22.  GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
57-64, 334-36 (1978). On Jefferson’s tutelage, see FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON,
LAWYER 10-11 (1986). Armitage mentions the legal connotations of the eighteenth-century 
concept of a declaration. ARMITAGE, supra note 12, at 31. He also more heavily emphasizes 
the Declaration’s legal dimensions in earlier work. David Armitage, The Declaration of 
Independence and International Law, 59 WM & MARY Q. 39, 45 (2002).
 23.  David T. Konig, Whig Lawyering in the Legal Education of Thomas Jefferson, in
THE LIBRARIES, LEADERSHIP, & LEGACY OF JOHN ADAMS AND THOMAS JEFFERSON 97, 104-
06 (Robert C. Baron & Conrad Edick Wright eds., 2010).
 24.  Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A 
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 748-50 (1976) (discussing Jefferson’s 
criticisms of Blackstone).
 25.  Konig, supra note 23, at 99-100.
 26.  Id. at 110 (quoting JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING-
ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 207-08 (1981)). 
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 Konig tells us that Jefferson was particularly impressed by John 
Holt, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, for a set of opinions in which 
Holt articulated the notion that government officials must be legally 
answerable to victims of their wrongs.27 One Holt dissent appears to 
have struck a particular chord with Jefferson.28 The underlying suit 
was a “simple action on the case” brought against two English post-
masters alleging that a postal employee’s mishandling of plaintiff’s 
letter had caused the plaintiff economic loss.29 Whereas his colleagues 
declined to impose liability, Holt argued that the officials ought to be 
held liable under ordinary principles of negligence.30 According to 
Konig, Jefferson took from this opinion and others the notion that 
English common law, rightly understood, would hold liable an official 
who commits an injurious wrong in the course of his official duties on 
about the same terms as a private citizen.31 In the language of Jeffer-
son’s case notes, “ ‘for misfeasance of a deputy an action will lie 
against him, not qua officer, but qua tort-feasor.’ ”32
 If one keeps in mind that Jefferson quite obviously understood 
what it meant for someone to be a “tort-feasor,” the legalistic aspects 
of the Declaration fall into sharper relief. The document reads as a 
tort complaint. It alleges grave and repeated “injuries.”33 In this con-
text, the term “injuries” carried a particular meaning, referring not 
merely to harms or depredations, but to wrongfully caused harms—
i.e., breaches of duties of noninjury.34 The familiar legal phrase dam-
num absque injuria helps capture the idea. It was used by lawyers to 
describe an instance in which one person harmed another (damnum)
but did not wrong them (absque injuria).35 To say there was no “inju-
ry” was just to say that there had been no breach of a duty of nonin-
jury. Conversely, a claim of “injury” was a claim to have suffered 
harm as the result of conduct recognized by the law as wrongful—
that is, a tort. 
 In the manner of a legal complaint, the Declaration also asserts 
that the colonists, by virtue of having been legally wronged, were 
now authorized by law to respond through the pursuit of particular 
                                                     
 27. Id. at 106.
 28. Id. at 110.
 29. Id.
 30. Id. at 111-12.
 31. Id. at 112.
 32.  Id. (quoting Jefferson’s notes). For a modern articulation of the claim that the idea 
of a “constitutional tort” meshes well with the idea of civil recourse, see Michael L. Wells, 
Civil Recourse, Damages-as-Redress, and Constitutional Torts (Feb. 14, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).
 33. THE DECLARATION, supra note 13, at para. 2.
 34.  Injury derives from the Latin “injuria,” meaning “wrong” or “violation of another’s 
legal right.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (9th ed. 2009).
 35.  Id. at 449-50.
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remedies.36 In the first instance, they were entitled to petition the 
crown for relief.37 Petitions having proved inadequate, however, the 
people were further empowered to withdraw their allegiance, to con-
stitute for themselves a new government, and to seek a judgment as 
to the validity of their assertion of independence.38 Independence is 
cast and justified as the securing of a remedy for a wrong done. And 
the remedy is claimed to be one to which the colonists are entitled as 
a matter of legal right.39
 Of course there are some obvious disanalogies between the Decla-
ration and an ordinary tort complaint. The Declaration is not a con-
ventional pleading document. It is not a lawsuit filed by one individ-
ual against another in an ordinary law court. It does not allege the 
commission of a garden-variety tort. And it does not seek the standard 
tort remedy of money damages. Beyond all this, there is a sense in 
which the Declaration attests to the failure of ordinary law. After all, 
English law authorized the colonists to invoke the mechanism of peti-
tioning to secure their rights, and that mechanism had failed them. 
 These observations notwithstanding, it is still cogent to character-
ize the Declaration as a tort complaint. On behalf of a class of per-
sons it asserts the commission of the same injurious legal wrong 
against each of them and seeks a remedy, authorized by law, on 
behalf of the each of them as against the wrongdoer. The relevant 
law, however, is not ordinary common law, but constitutional and 
international law. 
 Jefferson’s assertion that the colonists’ claims were authorized by 
the English Constitution marked a fundamental break from Black-
stone. Blackstone was prepared to acknowledge that the English 
people, as a last resort, were entitled to withdraw support for a gov-
ernment that had violated the terms of the unwritten English consti-
tution.40 But he insisted that this entitlement could not properly be 
described as a right under law. A legal right presupposes law, and 
law (according to Blackstone, following Hobbes) presupposes a sover-
eign.41 The act of dissolving the sovereign could not be an act author-
ized by law because such an act is a destruction of the very source of 
law. By contrast, Jefferson believed that the colonists’ renunciation of 
English sovereignty could be defended not merely as a justified act, 
but as the assertion of legal rights and the exercise of legal powers.42
                                                     
 36. THE DECLARATION, supra note 13, at para. 2.
 37. See id. at para. 4.
 38. See id.
 39. Id. at para. 1. 
 40.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238. This paragraph draws on the 
discussion of Blackstone in Goldberg, supra note 5, at 555-58. 
 41.  See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *46.  
 42. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 236-37 (1986). 
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  To be sure, “tyranny” was no ordinary tort: it would not be found 
alongside “trespass” in eighteenth century law digests. It was none-
theless a violation of the law governing the relation of the sovereign 
to each of his subjects. The colonists claimed for themselves the 
rights to liberty and security afforded by the unwritten English con-
stitution.43 These rights in turn tracked those guaranteed by the 
“Laws of Nature” invoked in the Declaration’s opening paragraph.44
Today there is greater skepticism about unwritten constitutional law 
and natural law. (This may be in part because some of what used to 
fall under these headings is now described in the more sociological 
idiom of “customary international law.”) But it would have been per-
fectly cogent for Jefferson to maintain that sovereigns are subject to 
authoritative norms—including norms forbidding tyrannical acts 
against subjects—that are authoritative by virtue of deriving from 
custom that is consonant with first principles or basic assumptions 
about human nature.45 He could thus assert with a straight face that 
tyranny, qua authoritative norm violation, really was of the same 
genus as more prosaic torts, even if a distinct species. 
 In addition to claiming that the colonists were the victims of a le-
gal wrong, the Declaration further maintains that their manner of 
responding, including the issuance of the Declaration itself, was au-
thorized by and in keeping with legal requirements. As previously 
noted, the Declaration acknowledges that the declarants bore the 
burden of making a certain showing. As they were the ones suing for 
independence, they were required to prove their cause of action and 
demonstrate their entitlement to relief. The claimed entitlement to 
the extraordinary remedy of independence further required the 
demonstration of the inadequacy of ordinary forms of relief. Hence 
the Declaration’s emphasis on the crown’s repeated denials of re-
quests for relief made through petitions for redress.46
                                                     
 43. Id. at 5.
 44. THE DECLARATION, supra note 13, at para. 1. John Reid has argued that natural 
law was “irrelevant” to the Declaration’s identification of the rights enjoyed by the 
colonists. See REID, supra note 42, at 88-92. This is overstated, if only because English 
jurists tended to understand the English Constitution as consonant with, and indeed the 
best instantiation of, natural law principles. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 532-33.
 45. See Armitage, supra note 22, at 42 (arguing that the Declaration must be 
understood as responsive to then-contemporary understandings of international law as a 
body of norms applicable to states); id. at 61-62 (discussing ways in which the Declaration 
straddled natural-law and positivist conceptions of international law); see also REID, supra
note 42, at 236-37 (emphasizing the Declaration’s underpinnings in pre-positivist Whig 
constitutionalism); Edward Dumbauld, Independence Under International Law, 70 AM. J.
INT’L L. 425, 426-27 (1976) (describing Jefferson’s adherence to principles of international 
law when serving as Secretary of State).
 46.  WILLS, supra note 22, at 57-64 (describing ways in which the Declaration built on 
the established practice of petitioning for the redress of constitutional violations).
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 As Armitage emphasizes, the Declaration is addressed to a partic-
ular audience: the established nations of the world.47 In this respect, 
too, it differs from an ordinary legal complaint that requests of a 
court the issuance of a judgment. Again, these differences only high-
light the ways in which the Declaration aimed to adapt the frame-
work of tort law for a special kind of claim. Here one must appreciate 
the manner in which other nations were being addressed. To use Jef-
ferson’s own later description—one highlighted by Wills—the Decla-
ration was “ ‘an appeal to the tribunal of the world.’ ”48 The juxtaposi-
tion of the terms “appeal” and “tribunal” indicate that the term “ap-
peal” is not only being used in its colloquial sense to refer to a plea 
for understanding and support, but also in a legal sense.49 As Wills 
notes, it was common practice at this time for a complainant in an 
ordinary lawsuit to supplement a bare-bones pleading with a “decla-
ration” articulating the grounds of the complaint and the relief 
sought.50 The Declaration is just that sort of document. It articulates 
a cause of action and seeks an adjudication by other nations in their 
capacity as a tribunal.  
 Nor was the idea of nations operating as a tribunal merely rhetor-
ical. The colonists could claim that their assertion of independence 
constituted a legitimate exercise in lawful self-help. But it was left to 
the nations of the world—particularly the European powers—to ad-
judicate this claim. Not unlike a domestic court adjudicating an indi-
vidual’s claim to be entitled to possess property that he had already 
seized from another under a claim of right, these nations would de-
cide whether to recognize the justness of the colonists’ complaints 
and, hence, the right of the colonists to have established the United 
States of America. The Declaration was declaratory in the sense of an 
assertion. At the same time, it sought declaratory relief in the form of 
a pronouncement from other nations on the validity of its assertion.51
The colonists’ pursuit of this form of relief was of course pragmati-
cally motivated. Their immediate goal was to clear the way for sup-
port from France, as well as Spain and Holland.52 To do so, however, 
they had to establish themselves as something other than rebellious 
                                                     
 47.  ARMITAGE, supra note 12, at 31.
 48.  WILLS, supra note 22, at 335 (emphasis added) (quoting Jefferson’s papers).
 49.  The term “appeal” was once used to describe a certain kind of first-level legal 
proceeding, as well as a request for higher court review of a lower court decision. An 
“appeal of felony,” for example, was a suit brought by the victim of a serious crime 
requesting that the state impose punishment on the alleged felon at the behest of the 
victim. David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law,
76 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 61-62 (1996). The Declaration was perhaps an “appeal” in both senses. 
It initiates a proceeding, but it is also an appeal from the King’s prior refusal to grant relief 
pursuant to the colonists’ petitions for redress.
 50. See WILLS, supra note 22, at 335.
 51. Armitage, supra note 22, at 47-48.
 52. WILLS, supra note 22, at 325-30. 
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British subjects. If they could not, other nations who supported their 
cause would be deemed under international law to have declared war 
against Britain by intervening in its domestic affairs.53 The colonists’ 
declaring themselves to be independent was a necessary step toward 
earning recognition as a free-standing confederation with the powers 
and responsibilities conferred on nations by international law.54
However, it was not sufficient. Also required was a judgment of the 
major European powers that their assertion was justified.55 The cen-
tral ambition of the Declaration was to demonstrate the colonists’ 
entitlement to this judgment. Indeed, the document’s most funda-
mental and radical claim is that the colonists’ status as victims of 
oppression at the hands of their sovereign, the unavailability to them 
of ordinary forms of relief, and their successfully having united as a 
“People” capable of self-governance entitled the federated states to 
recognition as an independent political entity.56 In this respect, the 
Declaration really was a pleading, one that sought a declaratory 
judgment as to the independent status of the United States under 
international law, with independence constituting a remedy as 
against royal predations. In turn, the question of whether to grant to 
the United States the legal rights and privileges of statehood was to 
be determined by the European powers, applying then-prevalent 
standards of international law.57 Initially, none of them ruled favora-
bly.58 In two years’ time, however, France reversed course, as did Hol-
land after another four years.59 Soon thereafter, the colonists pre-
vailed when Britain formally recognized U.S. independence. 
 The Declaration is the work of a logician and a rhetorician. But it 
is first and foremost the work of a lawyer. It connects rights and re-
sponsibilities on the same terms as does tort law, understood as a law 
of civil recourse. Jefferson’s document invokes the idea of a primary 
duty of noninjury. In this case, it is the duty of a government not to 
deprive its subjects of their civil and political rights. It offers allega-
tions that this duty has been breached.60 It asserts that the breach 
                                                     
 53. Id. at 325-26.
 54. MIKULAS FABRY, RECOGNIZING STATES: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW STATES SINCE 1776, at 7 (2010) (noting adverse consequences 
associated with the failure of a putative state to obtain recognition by established states); 
see also Dumbauld, supra note 45, at 425-26 (observing that, in declaring independence, the 
Founders acknowledged that the United States was subject to the rules of international law).
 55. FABRY, supra note 54, at 27.
 56. Id. at 25 (noting that the colonists asserted their independence on “novel” terms 
that emphasized their right to recognition as a self-determining people who had 
demonstrated their ability to self-govern). 
 57. Id. at 30 (discussing the efforts of the French government to justify to the British 
government, under international law principles, its decision to recognize the United States 
as independent).
 58.  Id. at 27.
 59. Id. at 29, 33.
 60. THE DECLARATION, supra note 13, at para. 3.
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entitles the victims to redress through ordinary channels (petition).61
And, it adds that, because this relief has proved unavailable, resort is 
authorized to political self-help.62 Even this asserted privilege is 
granted by law (namely, the English Constitution as an expression of 
natural law) and exercised under law. Hence it is subject to a deter-
mination by a tribunal—the tribunal of nations—as to the validity of 
the claims of wrongdoing and the assertion of an entitlement to inde-
pendence as recourse against tyranny. 
 Though extraordinary in application, this is the language of tort 
law. Far from being a chapter in our later history, tort law is in our 
political DNA. The concept of a tort figured centrally in setting the 
terms on which our nation was founded. Tort law—understood as law 
defining relational, injurious legal wrongs that generate in victims a 
legal right of recourse and a corresponding legal liability in the 
wrongdoer—supplied the framework through which Jefferson assert-
ed the colonists’ entitlement to independence. The Declaration of In-
dependence is our founding lawsuit.  
III.   EMPOWERING ALIENS TO SUE FOR TORTS
 The Judiciary Act of 1789 was among the First Congress’s most 
important enactments, establishing as it did the structure of the fed-
eral courts. Section 9 of Chapter 20 of that Act is now commonly re-
ferred to as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). As originally enacted, it 
stated that federal district courts “ ‘shall . . . have cognizance, concur-
rent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, . . . of 
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.’ ”63
 A version of this law is still on the books today and has been in-
terpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to grant jurisdiction to federal 
courts to hear suits by foreign citizens alleging violations of their 
human rights at the hands of foreign officials and perhaps other ac-
tors who aid and abet those violations.64 It is very unlikely, however, 
that human rights litigation is what anyone had in mind back in 
1789.65 Instead, as Thomas Lee first demonstrated,66 Section 9 almost 
                                                     
 61. Id. at para. 4.
 62. Id. at paras. 4-6.
 63.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 (2004) (quoting the original 
language of Chapter 20, Section 9). The statute currently reads: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
 64.  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. For a discussion of the current split among federal 
courts of appeal on the issue of corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, see 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011). The Supreme 
Court is poised to resolve at least some aspects of this split. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petrol. Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
 65.  It does not necessarily follow that modern ATS litigation is therefore illegitimate. 
Even if litigation of the sort seen today is not what the enacting Congress contemplated, 
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certainly had as its main objective the more mundane task of ena-
bling foreign citizens to pursue in federal court ordinary tort claims 
alleging personal injury and property damage.  
 As Lee explains, the term “alien,” as used in Section 9, refers to a 
private citizen of a foreign nation, as opposed to either a U.S. citizen 
or a foreign official.67 U.S citizens, of course, already enjoyed the pro-
tections of domestic tort law. Foreign officials did not need the help of 
the ATS because their suits fell within the trial jurisdiction of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Although foreign private citizens were thus the 
intended beneficiaries of the ATS, not all such persons were in need 
of, or qualified for, the benefit of its jurisdictional grant. Aliens with 
high-stakes claims—those exceeding $500—would benefit from a 
separate provision of the Judiciary Act.68 And among those with 
claims worth less than $500, the ATS, according to Lee, empowered 
suit only by persons tortiously injured while present in the United States 
or U.S.-controlled areas under the auspices of a “safe conduct.”69
 Safe-conduct status was conferred on particular individuals by the 
issuance of a government document such as a passport.70 It was also 
conferred on large classes of actors by treaty provision or by custom-
ary international law.71 For example, foreign merchants in the Unit-
ed States on business purposes were deemed by custom to be the 
beneficiaries of an implied safe conduct.72 Thus, by virtue of the ATS, 
a British merchant who, while doing business in the United States, 
was detained or roughed-up by a local sheriff could file a claim in 
federal district court against the sheriff for false imprisonment or 
battery. He thereby stood to obtain a remedy for the wrong done that 
might not have been forthcoming in local or state courts.73
                                                                                                                            
the significance of that fact for the right reading of the statute will depend on matters of 
statutory interpretation.
 66.  See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006). Professors Bellia and Clark have recently published a careful 
history of the ATS that, though it differs in important respects from Professor Lee’s, shares 
his view that the ATS was enacted primarily to ensure that the United States complied 
with its international-law obligation to provide a means of recourse for aliens wrongfully 
injured by U.S. citizens. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute 
and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 454 (2011).
 67.  Lee, supra note 66, at 851-56.
 68. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; see Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 509.
 69. Lee, supra note 66, at 871. 
 70. Id. at 874.
 71. Id. at 874-75.
 72. Id. at 837.
 73.  Id. at 897-98 (providing this example). Bellia and Clark offer a reading of the 
ATS’s grant of jurisdiction that is both broader and narrower than Lee’s. It is broader in 
supposing that the ATS made the federal courts available to any alien who was a citizen of 
a nation friendly to the United States and who suffered a certain kind of tort at the hands 
of a U.S. citizen, regardless of whether the tort was committed while the alien enjoyed the 
benefit of a safe conduct (and, indeed, regardless whether the tort occurred in the United 
States or U.S.-controlled territory). It is narrower in supposing that the provision applied 
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 For present purposes, the most notable feature of the ATS is the 
fact of its enactment. Amidst the tumult and uncertainty of the early 
years of the Republic, with a new, untested, and controversial federal 
government having just been established, why would Congress have 
thought it important that foreigners be empowered to pursue tort 
claims in federal court? 
 The first-level answer resides in pragmatic concerns characteristic 
of international relations. It was important for the new and still frag-
ile nation to avoid giving Britain and other powers reasons to “cut off 
trade, or even to wage renewed war.”74 More generally, the provision 
sent a signal to those who would do business in the United States 
that they would benefit from the law’s protections when in this coun-
try. But this explanation in turn incorporates certain political and 
legal norms—norms that ultimately explain why the failure to pro-
vide federal jurisdiction over alien tort claims might be the sort of 
thing that would incite retaliation from foreign powers.  
 Indeed, today one might fairly wonder how the First Congress 
could possibly have concluded there was a need for the provision of 
federal court jurisdiction over standard-issue tort claims, especially 
given a separate provision granting jurisdiction over high-value 
claims. Contemporary courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 
have supposed that the impetus for the alien tort provision must 
have been something grander, pointing to a pair of politically embar-
rassing incidents involving the mistreatment of foreign officials.75
This supposition rests on the further supposition that it is implausi-
ble to believe that the First Congress would have thought it im-
portant to ensure that our courts were receptive to suits raising 
humdrum claims for battery or trespass to chattels. 
 As Lee demonstrates, these suppositions are mistaken. While in-
cidents involving dignitaries probably contributed to a general con-
cern for the unavailability of recourse to foreign citizens, the need to 
ensure an adequate avenue of recourse for foreign officials was dealt 
with in a separate jurisdictional provision.76 The ATS was instead 
adopted for the benefit of private citizens wishing to bring standard-
issue tort claims. And it was adopted for their benefit because of the 
longstanding recognition in Anglo-American law, and international 
law, of the importance attached to a government’s performance of its 
obligation to provide recourse to victims of wrongs. 
                                                                                                                            
only to intentional, forcible torts, and only when such torts were committed by a U.S. 
citizen, as opposed to another alien. Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 515-25. 
 74.  Lee, supra note 66, at 837.
 75.  Id. at 859-66 (discussing a 1784 incident involving a French official (Marbois) and 
a 1787 incident involving a Dutch official (van Berckel)).
 76.  Id. (explaining that the Marbois and van Berckel incidents gave rise to a separate 
provision granting federal court jurisdiction over officials’ tort claims).
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 Blackstone, Lee explains, deemed violations of safe conducts an 
offense against the law of nations and a “just ground of a national 
war.”77 Blackstone elaborated his position as follows. A sovereign (the 
“prince”) owes it to his subjects to see that justice among them is 
done. This is an affirmative responsibility of government, requiring, 
among other things, that he establish courts that operate according 
to law and that punish wrongdoing and provide redress to victims of 
wrongs.78 Having courts enforce laws that identify, enjoin, punish, 
and provide recourse for wrongs is a basic right—a right to the pro-
tections of the law. 
 Blackstone recognized that, in the case of a tort committed in 
Britain by a British subject against a foreign citizen, the foreign sov-
ereign might be unable, practically, to fulfill this responsibility. Alt-
hough he was entitled to arrange for punishment of the wrongdoer 
and recourse for the victim,79 it would sometimes be “not in the power 
of the foreign prince to cause justice to be done to his subjects by the 
very individual delinquent.”80 Because, in this special case, the for-
eign sovereign lacks the power to do that which it is his responsibility 
to do, he is entitled to call upon his subjects for assistance that will 
enable him to discharge his duty. In short, he could legitimately re-
quire “the whole community” to join him in rising up against Britain 
to enable him to provide justice to the aggrieved citizen.81
 To forestall this undesirable prospect, English law had long recog-
nized the King’s authority to grant express and implied safe con-
ducts. To grant a safe conduct is to place the grantee “under the pro-
tection of the king and the law”—to confer on him the same rights to 
law and recourse that British citizens would enjoy while in areas un-
der British control. Thus, said Blackstone, “any violation of either the 
person or property of such foreigner may be punished by indictment” 
as an offense against the king, who has in effect pledged to other na-
tions to provide for the foreigner’s safety.82 He might have added, as 
did Vattel in his work on international relations, that the king would 
also be required to see to it that the victim received reparations from 
the tortfeasor.83
                                                     
 77.  Id. at 871-72 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *68).
 78.  3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *115-16 (noting that for those wrongs 
“committed in the mutual intercourse between subject and subject,” the crown is “officially 
bound to [provide] redress in the ordinary forms of law”).
 79. The authority to punish wrongdoing was widely understood to be universal, rather 
than being an authority that a sovereign could exercise only with respect to its own 
citizens. See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 81-86, 171 (1999) (discussing the thought 
of Grotius and Locke). 
 80.  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *68-69.
 81.  Lee, supra note 66, at 69. 
 82.  Id.
 83.  Id. at 872 (discussing Vattel).
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 Turning back to the Judiciary Act, Lee explains as follows:  
[A] safe conduct signified a sovereign obligation on the part of the 
United States to prevent injury to the person or property of an al-
ien within its territory . . . . Where a safe conduct was implicated, 
the United States assumed correlative duties to punish the injurer 
under its criminal laws . . . and to oblige the injurer to pay damag-
es for the injury.84
In sum, the alien tort provision was a statutory recognition and ful-
fillment of the government’s obligation to extend to certain foreigners 
the same right to the protection of the laws enjoyed by its own citi-
zens. It was included in the Judiciary Act of 1798 in large part be-
cause of a post-Revolutionary War track record suggesting that state 
courts could not be trusted to fulfill this obligation.85 The Founders—
and the nations with which they hoped to establish constructive rela-
tions—regarded the failure to live up to this obligation as a failure to 
live up to a basic governmental responsibility, one not merely posited 
as a matter of political theory but recognized in international law.86
 Like the Declaration, the ATS attests to the centrality of tort law, 
understood as a law of civil recourse, to the founding era. The rele-
vant provision of the Judiciary Act invokes the word “tort” advisedly. 
It did not emerge out of a preternatural desire among the Founders 
to have the fledging federal courts serve as fora for the vindication of 
what are now taken to be universal human rights.87 It was justified 
on the narrower and more legalistic grounds that individuals are en-
titled to an avenue of legal recourse against wrongdoers for the 
wrongs done to them, and that a state bears a concomitant responsi-
bility, recognized in international law, to give them a means of seek-
ing and obtaining meaningful redress. 
IV.   TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR OFFICIAL WRONGDOING
 In a recent article, James Pfander and Jonathan Hunt discuss the 
congressional practice, commenced in the early years of the Republic, 
of indemnifying federal officials who had been held liable, or were in 
danger of being held liable, for wrongs committed in the course of 
                                                     
 84.  Id. at 873.
 85. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 66, at 494-507 (reviewing instances of state courts 
failing to provide recourse to foreign citizens). 
 86. Id. at 507 (“[T]he ATS is best understood as one of several means by which the 
First Congress sought to ensure that the United States would comply with its obligations 
under the law of nations and avoid giving foreign nations just cause for war.”).
 87. Arguably, eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought lacked even an 
approximation of modern conceptions of universal human rights. See generally SAMUEL
MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
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performing their official duties.88 Because of the common law doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, claims by alleged victims of official wrongdo-
ing were not litigated as suits against the government. Yet, this did 
not render tort law irrelevant to official misconduct, because immuni-
ty was not understood to extend to individual officials.89 For example, 
a ship owner seeking damages for an allegedly wrongful seizure of 
his ship by a U.S. warship could bring a claim in trespass against the 
captain of the warship.90 Likewise, if a federal revenue officer, acting 
pursuant to a federal court judgment, mistakenly seized the property 
of a person other than the judgment-debtor, the property owner could 
bring a trespass claim against the officer. 
 In keeping with the common law’s definition of the tort of conver-
sion, liability was not fault-based. Instead, it would attach to any in-
tentional seizure of property that proved to be unjustified, even if the 
official who seized the property did so in the reasonable but mistaken 
belief that he was authorized to seize it.91 A warship captain who 
seized another’s ship in the reasonable belief that the other ship was 
engaging in activity that would justify its seizure faced liability if it 
turned out that the captain, though acting reasonably, was mistaken. 
Only if the seizure were in fact authorized would liability be avoided. 
 Under this regime, federal officers could face potentially ruinous 
liability for understandable mistakes committed in the course of dis-
charging their official duties. However, they had available to them a 
mechanism by which to ameliorate this risk. They could petition 
Congress to enact a private bill that would authorize a payment to 
the official for the amount of his liability. According to Pfander and 
Hunt, an early precedent for this form of relief lay in a bill successful-
ly sought on behalf of the Danish owner of a ship that had been 
wrongfully seized and that resulted in an 1802 enactment by Con-
gress providing direct compensation to the owner.92 Likewise, in re-
sponse to the July 1800 seizure of the schooner Charming Betsy by 
Captain Alexander Murray, a subsequent court judgment holding 
                                                     
 88.  James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: 
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1862 (2010).
 89.  Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and 
Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 525 (2003) (noting that the 
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity allowed for various forms of governmental 
liability, including liability of individual federal officials for their torts, “even if they were 
[committed] pursuant to a presidential order”).
 90.  Id. (offering this example).
 91.  However, evidence of good faith would provide a ground for refusing a claim for 
punitive damages. Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1923. As Pfander and Hunt observe, 
liability of this sort served as a counterweight to the incentives created by the fact that 
officials would often stand to profit personally from valid seizures through commissions 
and forfeitures. Id. at 1917.
 92.  Id. at 1880-86 (discussing legislation compensating one Paolo Paoly for damages 
awarded in a judicial proceeding that determined that the capture of his ship was wrongful).
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Murray liable to the schooner’s owner for wrongfully seizing it, and 
the filing by Murray of a petition for a private bill, Congress in 1805 
enacted a law that indemnified Murray on the ground that his ac-
tions, though tortious, were taken in a good faith effort to discharge 
his duties.93
 Over the next three decades, the indemnification process became 
routinized. Typically, a petition would be filed in the House of Repre-
sentatives and referred to a standing House committee that would 
review the merits of the claim. In turn, the Committee would issue a 
report and recommendation which, if favoring indemnification and 
adopted by both houses, would become law. Pfander and Hunt identi-
fy dozens of instances of petitions for indemnification filed in Con-
gress between 1789 and 1860, with sixty percent of these resulting in 
legislation appropriating funds either to indemnify the petitioning 
official or to pay victims directly.94
 As a predicate to relief, the petitioner would have to make a show-
ing that his actions were consistent with his instructions or within 
the scope of his authority.95 The House Committee adjudicated this 
issue in the manner of a court, receiving evidence, applying certain 
principles of agency law, and citing earlier dispositions of petitions as 
precedents.96 Indeed, for ease of reference, prior dispositions were 
gathered in a compendium compiled by the clerk of the House.97 The-
se practices and procedures were sufficiently judicial in nature that 
indemnification for acts undertaken within the scope of an official’s 
authority was widely understood to be “more as a matter of right 
than as a matter of legislative grace.”98 Such was the view expressed 
by the Taney Court in an 1836 decision, Tracy v. Swartwout.99 In ef-
fect, there was a recognized responsibility on the part of Congress to 
indemnify officials for tort liabilities incurred in discharging their 
official duties, with Congress retaining for itself the job of determin-
ing if a given official had discharged his duties in good faith so as to 
trigger the duty to indemnify. 
 Pfander and Hunt’s study of the antebellum practice of indemnifi-
cation is an important addition to the literature suggesting that it is 
mistaken to suppose that the doctrine of sovereign immunity served 
as anything like a complete bar to the imposition of liability on the 
                                                     
 93.  Id. at 1900-01.
 94.  Id. at 1867.
 95. Id. at 1906-07.
 96. Id. at 1910.
 97. Id. at 1910-11.
 98.  Id.; see also id. at 1911-12.
99.  Id. at 1912-13. “[S]ome personal inconvenience may be experienced by an officer 
who shall be held responsible in damages for illegal acts done under instructions of a 
superior; but, as the government in such cases is bound to indemnify the officer, there can 
be no eventual hardship.” Id. (quoting Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 80, 98-99 (1836)).
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U.S. government.100 The doctrine instead is better understood as hav-
ing operated to “direct[] the individual’s application for redress into 
the proper procedural channels.”101 A complainant alleging official 
misconduct was required to sue the individual official to obtain a ju-
dicial determination that a tort had in fact been committed. Then, 
usually at the behest of that official, Congress would take on the task 
of determining whether the official’s tort was committed in the course 
of a good-faith effort to discharge his duties.102 In these cases, “sover-
eign immunity” meant only that the question of whether an official 
had acted within the scope of his duties was not for the courts: they 
were deemed incompetent to make judgments as to the appropriate 
occasions for spending taxpayer money in satisfaction of liabilities 
incurred by federal officials.103 Instead, the “within-the-scope-of-duty” 
inquiry was a matter for Congress.104 And yet, it was not a purely dis-
cretionary decision. Upon receiving a petition for indemnification, 
Congress was to decide the scope-of-duty question in accordance with 
precedent and principle.105
 The quasi-judicial practice of congressional indemnification re-
veals that petitioning Congress for redress was not merely notional 
but was taken seriously as a means of asserting a kind of claim more 
forceful than a mere plea for consideration. It thereby suggests that 
American practice in this respect tracked Blackstone’s view that peti-
tions could constitute a genuine form of legal redress.106 The practice 
also gives lie to the notion that sovereign immunity entailed that 
government could simply disavow responsibility for wrongs commit-
ted by officials. Government was responsible for acts committed by 
officials in the good faith pursuit of their official duties. It is true that 
the determination of the “good faith” issue would only follow on a ju-
dicial judgment that a tort had been committed, and on a petition 
from the tortfeasor to Congress requesting indemnification. And it is 
also true that Congress reserved for itself the authority to make that 
determination, a reservation to which courts acquiesced. But it hard-
ly followed that Congress was free to absolve itself of responsibility 
                                                     
 100.  See Jackson, supra note 89, at 541-52 (discussing this literature, but also noting 
that Congress’s control over the federal courts de facto has historically given Congress a 
great deal of power to determine the scope of governmental liability).
 101.  Pfander & Hunt, supra note 88, at 1918-19.
 102. Id. at 1868.
 103. Id.
 104. Id. 
 105.  Pfander and Hunt explain that, in certain instances—for example, those in which 
the official had disappeared—Congress would pay the victim directly rather than refuse to 
pay on the ground that its only duty was to indemnify the official. Id. at 1919.
 106.  See James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a 
First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 899, 921-26 (1997) (discussing Blackstone’s views). I do not mean to take a position on 
whether Pfander is correct to assert that a constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity 
violates the First Amendment’s petition clause.
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as it saw fit, and this was not the practice. Instead, the question of 
whether the official had committed a wrong while discharging his 
duties in good faith was adjudicated in Congress, and indemnifica-
tion was seen as something to which officials who had acted in good 
faith were entitled as a matter of right.  
 Built into the practice of indemnification through petition are the 
connections among the multiple senses of responsibility that civil re-
course theory identifies as the hallmark of tort law. Although they 
benefited from certain special privileges, officials, just as ordinary 
citizens, were subject to certain duties of noninjury, including a duty 
not to convert the property of others. Violations of that duty permit-
ted a response, through law, by the property owner against the offi-
cial. The law, in turn, discharged government’s duty to enable vic-
tims of wrongs to obtain redress for wrongs done to them. Beyond 
this, Congress acknowledged a responsibility to adjudicate the ques-
tion of whether the official in question was entitled to indemnifica-
tion for having committed the tort while discharging his official du-
ties in good faith. This, too, was understood as a responsibility, not 
merely a matter of largesse. 
 That Congress in the early decades of the republic stood ready to 
make good on claims against federal officials is another testament to 
the degree to which tort law was taken seriously. Officials were un-
derstood as owing legal duties not to mistreat citizens that, if 
breached, subjected them to liability. In turn, the federal govern-
ment, as principal, understood itself to be obligated to stand behind 
its agents and make good on their tort debts, even to the point of set-
ting up elaborate institutional procedures that required affirmative 
legislative acts to fulfill its obligation. Today, by contrast, individual 
officials are largely immunized from liability and often governmental 
entities are as well.107 And even as the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
state counterparts have routinized and in some ways expanded upon 
early Congressional practice by authorizing the judicial imposition of 
liability on governments for officials’ torts, those statutes have at the 
same time empowered courts to expand governmental immunity.108
                                                     
 107.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer 
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 483-84 (2011) (observing that, in the post-Warren 
Court period, the U.S. Supreme Court has “expanded state sovereign immunity, made it 
difficult to establish constitutional violations by cities and counties, selectively stiffened 
justiciability doctrines, cut back on the Bivens cause of action for damages against federal 
officials who have violated constitutional rights, and elevated the burdens of pleading in 
suits against government officials”) (footnotes omitted); Jackson, supra note 89, at 563-67 
(2003) (reviewing limitations on governmental tort liability). Of course sovereign immunity 
also dates back to the founding era and, as Fallon cogently argues, immunities might 
sometimes serve the cause of responsibility by creating a space in which official 
responsibilities can be acknowledged. Fallon, supra, at 481-95.
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-35 (1991) (interpreting the 
discretionary function exemption to the FTCA to apply to any official decision calling for an 
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The notion that officials and government entities can be held legally 
responsible by victims of their wrongs is in many instances giving way 
to the notion that government may act with impunity toward its citizens. 
CONCLUSION
 Understanding tort law as a law of civil recourse enables us to see 
that tort was central to our system of law at the founding. Evidence 
for this claim resides not only in the foregoing examples but in Jus-
tice Marshall’s famous invocation of the ubi jus ibi remedium maxim 
in Marbury v. Madison,109 in the guarantees of open courts and reme-
dies found in early state constitutions, and elsewhere.110 Indeed, the 
idea that tort law is a relative newcomer is at least in one respect ex-
actly backwards. It is only in the modern era that we encounter the 
view that government enjoys powers without responsibilities, such 
that the granting of an avenue of recourse to victims of wrongs 
against wrongdoers is taken to be a matter of legislative grace111 and 
such that officials and governments are said to benefit from broad 
immunities from liability.  
 It perhaps should go without saying that the foregoing observations 
are not offered out of general nostalgia for the way things once were. 
In many regards, we can only count our blessings to be rid of the old 
ways. Nor does any particular policy prescription immediately flow 
from my historical analysis. Tort law has in some respects expanded 
its reach well beyond anything members of the Founding era could 
envision, and that fact alone cautions against simply applying older 
notions of the proper place of tort law in contemporary circumstances. 
 Still, it is far from obvious that we are moving in the right direc-
tion when it comes to thinking about rights and responsibilities. To a 
degree that is difficult to define, we (at least those in the legal acad-
emy) have lost our feel for tort’s character as a law of civil recourse. 
In doing so, we are in danger of losing sight of our rights and our re-
sponsibilities, including responsibilities that citizens owe one another 
and responsibilities that government owes its citizens. 
 There is something darkly ironic in the thought that tort law is a 
modern invention. Early American lawyers understood what it meant 
for the law to identify conduct as tortious. In doing so, they grasped 
what many today at least profess to find mysterious, namely, the idea 
                                                                                                                            
exercise of judgment or discretion in connection with the furtherance of a government 
mandate or policy).
 109. See 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803). 
 110.  Goldberg, supra note 5, at 559-64.
 111.  The prevailing view among lawyers today seems to be that, so long as Congress 
acts within its constitutionally allotted authority, it is free to enact federal legislation that 
renders state tort law null and void without having to provide a substitute for it. Id. at 527-
28, 588.
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that law should (among other things) identify forms of mistreatment 
and empower victims of mistreatment to respond to those who have 
wronged them. The idea of a tort—a legally defined injurious wrong 
for which the victim is entitled to an avenue of recourse—was an or-
ganizing concept for the Founders. So too was the idea that govern-
ment bears a responsibility—indeed, a legal responsibility—to pro-
vide a law of recourse to its citizens, and even to “aliens.” And so too 
was the idea that officials and governments themselves are subject to 
being held accountable through tort law for their injurious legal 
wrongs. In each of these respects, theirs was an era of tort law 
whereas ours is an era of tort reform. 
